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Available online 3 February 2016AbstractIn this study, we analyze the effects of internal political risk on the Turkish stock market in the period of 2001e2014. Empirical analyses are
conducted through various methods to obtain breaks and regimes in the return volatilities of the BIST100 index. According to the results, while
the number of breaks has increased in recent years, the risk level of recent periods is significantly lower than the early regimes, and the risk level
trend for all regimes show a negative slope. In conclusion, the Turkish stock market responds to political events, but according to our results, not
as significantly as in the past.
Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Jel classification: D72; F59; P16; G32
Keywords: Political risk; Turkish stock market; Financial stability; Volatility breaks1. Introduction
Financial risk is usually broken down into three categories:
market risk (interest rate, currency rate, and liquidity), credit
risk, and operational risk. However, another prominent risk
category is political risk, especially for emerging markets.
Therefore, investors who want to penetrate emerging markets
are nervous about the destabilization which arises from gov-
ernment turnover and the resulting policy changes in the
economy and international relations. As a result of these de-
velopments, the increasing volatility in these markets affects
all aspects of the economy; from currency rates, to interest
rates, liquidity and asset prices, and unfortunately can cause
financial turbulence or crises that are beyond stabilization. In
addition, controls in hot money flows (such as Tobin tax),
privatization/nationalization, and employment and mining
policies also shape the perceptions of investors regarding the
political risk of a country. These types of operations are direct
interventions, made by policy-makers, on the market economy.E-mail address: dr.sgunay@gmail.com.
Peer review under responsibility of Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2016.01.003
2214-8450/Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hos
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Hence, besides the economic activities, political decisions of
varying periods of government, contribute significantly to the
economic conditions of emerging markets.
The uncertain environment caused by political instability
affects the risk-return profiles of these countries, and can
induce an increase in the required rate of return of current and
future investments. This, in conjunction with the higher
borrowing rates in domestic and international markets, may
lead governments to decrease public expenditures and increase
tax rates. In the long run, the subsequent decline in living
standards puts more pressure on the political power. This vi-
cious cycle has been experienced in the past years in Turkey,
leading to the formation of 13 different governments between
1990 and 2000. In spite of that, Turkey's economy has recently
performed very well. Besides the economic successes, we
believe that, the political transformation, and the subsequent
stability, is also an important topic of analysis for Turkey's
recent history. Although there is a great deal of interest to the
economic performance of Turkey in literature (Akat &
Yazgan, 2013; Dinar, Dalgıç, & _Iyidogan, 2015; G€ormez &
Yigit, 2009; Kutlay, 2015; Macovei, 2009; Pamuk, 2007) we
have seen that studies about the finance-politic structure of the
country are quite limited. Therefore, providing evidenceting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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literature. This goal is the motivation for this paper. Because
we believe that political instability cannot bring about sus-
tainable economic performance in any country, especially in
Turkey, which is surrounded by unstable neighbors. In
accordance with this, in this study, we empirically examine the
strength of the Turkish stock market against political
instability.
There are examples of the intricate relationship between
political risks and financial markets outside of Turkey. One of
the early examples is Cuba, when Cuban leader Fidel Castro
who seized the assets of US firms in 1959. In Mexico, political
instability triggered the crisis of 1994. The assassination of
Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate of the Party
of Institutional Revolution (PRI) before the elections in 1994,
and of the secretary general of the party following the elec-
tions, created political risk perceptions for foreign investors,
and the process which hurled Mexico into financial crisis
began. In recent times, the Russian crisis has arisen for similar
reasons. Political problems between Russia and Ukraine, the
sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU, and also
decreasing oil prices have caused serious problems in the
Russian economy.
When we analyze the history of Turkey over the last fifteen
years, we can see significant political events. The heavy eco-
nomic damage of 2001, and the subsequent social conse-
quences, led to government turnover on November 3, 2002.
Just before completing its first year in government, AKP
encountered an American policy regarding the reorganization
of the Middle East following the 9/11 attacks and presented
the March 1st 2003 memorandum to parliament, allowing
American troops to use Turkey's Iraq border during their in-
vasion of Iraq. As the Turkish parliament rejected membership
in the US-led coalition forces in Iraq, Turkish-American re-
lationships shifted to a different paradigm thereafter.
Depending on the result of the memorandum, an uncertain
atmosphere appeared with respect to the USA's support of
Turkey's EU membership bid, and Turkey's $8.5 million credit
application. A year later, in the local elections, AKP become
the ruling party by increasing it's percentage to 41.9% of the
vote. Subsequently in 2006, there were two important political
assignments; the Presidency of the General Staff, and the
Central Bank governor. As the president of the period vetoed
the first candidate proposed by the government for Central
Bank governor, the Central Bank of Turkey was governed by
proxy for a period before Durmus‚ Yılmaz was appointed as
the permanent governor on April 18, 2006. Although there was
some criticism in the media due to his wife's headscarf, it did
not lead to a serious political crisis. After a few months, on
July 31, 2006, the government appointed in full General Yas‚ar
B€uy€ukanıt as the president of the General Staff without
waiting for the Supreme Military Council. This was done in
order to prevent a second appointment crisis. Another impor-
tant development of this period is the attack on the State
Council on May 17, 2006, which would turn into a formidable
law case in the following years. Later, this attack is considered
a part of the attempted coup against the legally electedgovernment, and is included in the Ergenekon case. In
conjunction with, the Turkish army is also brought into the
crisis by an accusatory newspaper headline, and a second
indictment known as the “Balyoz case” is issued against
Turkish Army officers on January 20, 2010. Another important
detail about the Ergenekon case is the hand grenades found in
Umraniye, Istanbul on June 12, 2007. The ruling party, which
had won two elections; a local and a general, nominated
Abdullah G€ul as a candidate for president of Turkey in an
environment where republican demonstrations spread
throughout the country. At the night of the first tour (April 27,
2007) of the election, the Chief of General Staff Gen. Yas‚ar
B€uy€ukanıt published an e-memorandum on the internet site of
the Presidency of the General Staff that has been accepted as a
“post-modern coup” in subsequent years. In the first tour of the
election, AKP, which was stuck to the rule 367 (this was
applied for the first time in parliament), won its second general
elections with 46.58% of the vote on July 22, 2007 and
clinched the presidential election in August 2007 with the
victory of its candidate, Abdullah G€ul. In 2008, Prime Min-
ister Erdogan attempts to reassure and give confidence to the
nation that the mortgage crisis will pass at a tangent to Turkey,
though many perceive this as an underestimation. During the
American Mortgage Crisis of 2008, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya,
the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, applied
to the Court to close down AKP claiming that it has become “a
center for anti-secular activities”. On July 30, 2008, the
closure request was rejected and Turkey narrowly escaped a
political crisis once more. Durmus‚ Yılmaz, who had caused
the small-scale crisis in the appointment process, was selected
as the most successful central bank governor by the Journal of
Euromoney in 2009. AKP, which won a landslide victory in
the local and general elections on March 29, 2009 and June 12,
2011, encountered one of the biggest protests in the history of
Turkish Republic in the summer of 2013. Actions started on
May 27, 2013 when five trees in Gezi Park were uprooted by
municipal officials. Protests spread throughout the whole
country turning into anti-government demonstrations.
Approximately six months after the Gezi Park demonstrations,
many public officers, bureaucrats and ministers are taken into
custody for corruption allegations. This investigation, which is
known today as the 17 December operation, is deemed an
attempted coup by the government. Afterward, many police
officers involved in the 17 December investigation, and other
related officials from the civil and public ranks were arrested
in a counter operation. The investigation and counter-
operation had little effect on the local elections on March
30, 2014, and the ruling party AKP again emerged as the
leading party with 43.39% of the vote. The presidential elec-
tion of August 10, 2014, which is the first to be held nationally
rather than within parliament, was closely followed both na-
tionally and internationally in politics. Out of three candidates
Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his victory and became the
12th President of Republic of Turkey.
As can be seen from the process mentioned above, even in
single party rule, Turkey's politics are quite turbulent. As a
matter of course a significant part of these developments have
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and business operations. From this point forth, the scope of
this study is to analyze the effect of these political de-
velopments on the BIST100 index returns. According to most
of the national and world public opinion, the political risk of
Turkey is relatively low compared to previous years. In this
regard, we aim to determine whether or not this opinion is
justified.
2. Literature review
In the analysis of political risk there is no consensus within
the literature concerning techniques and model type. We have
seen that different authors have utilized a very wide range of
approximations in their analyses. In one early study, Howell
and Chaddick (1994) compare the projections of three
different political risk models regarding the economic losses
between 1987 and 1992 and then analyze the correlations
between index data and loss indicators. Bailey and Chung
(1995) examine the effect of political risk and currency rate
fluctuations on the risk premiums of Mexican stocks, and
conclude that the stock market is exposed to these risks.
Cosset and Suret (1995) investigate the returns of portfolio
investments in politically risky countries. The study shows that
diversification among risky countries improves the risk-return
characteristics, and thus that a diversified portfolio is optimal.
Diamonte, Liew, and Stevens (1996) demonstrate that political
risk is a significant factor that affecting stock returns, and this
effect is higher in emerging markets than in developed mar-
kets. Another finding of the authors is the increasing level of
political risk in developed markets compared to emerging
markets in the last decade. Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996)
discuss political risk with four different country risk in-
dicators, and analyze whether or not these indicators present
any predictions for future stock returns. According to the re-
sults, future stock returns correlate with country risk factors. In
this same period, Clark (1997) associatively develops a model
to measure political risk for foreign direct investments. Clark
and Tunaru (2001) introduce a different model that measures
the effect of political risk in portfolio investments, taking into
consideration that political risks are multivariate and corre-
lated among countries. Nogues and Grandes (2001) analyze
the determinants of the country spreads of Argentina and
found six significant variables; growth expectations, fiscal
deficits, the debt service to export ratio and its growth rate,
contagion effects, external shocks, and political risks. Perotti
and van Oijen (2001) examine the indirect effects of privati-
zation to the local stock market in emerging countries in terms
of political risk. The results show that privatizations correlate
with increases in political risks. Noordin, Harjito, and Hazir
(2006) investigate the political risk assessment strategies of
22 Malaysian based international companies. The authors
demonstrate that most of these companies prefer a “good
citizen policy” as a method of decreasing political risk. As for
Yapraklı and G€ung€or (2007), they inspect the effects of three
different titles on the BIST100 returns and show that there is a
significant relationship between BIST100 returns andeconomic, financial and political risk premiums. Additionally,
while the authors find causality between economic and polit-
ical risks and the BIST100 index, they cannot find any cau-
sality between financial risk and the BIST100 index. Tunaru
and Clark (2008) model political risk as a value of a hypo-
thetic insurance policy, which covers losses arising from po-
litical events. Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) examine the
effect of political risks on the capital structure of foreign af-
filiates of international firms. According to the obtained re-
sults, when political risk increases, ownership rate decreases,
and depending on the type of political risk, leverage either
increases or decreases. In a different study, S¸anlısoy and K€ok
(2010) analyze the effect of political instability on economic
growth, and find an inverse relationship. _Ikizlerli and U¨lk€u
(2011) investigate the relationship between political risk and
foreign investor behaviors using the quantified political risk
ratings reported by ICRG and the foreign flows data compiled
by Istanbul Stock Exchange. They show that while the effect
of political risk to upgraded countries is slow and low, it has an
immediate effect regarding on downgraded countries. Addi-
tionally, they state that the tourism sector is more sensitive to
political issues. Baldacci, Gupta, and Mati (2011) estimate the
determinants of country risk premiums for 46 emerging mar-
ket economies, and state that both political and fiscal risks are
significant on country risk premiums. Baek and Qian (2011)
analyze whether or not political risk has the same effects on
developed and emerging countries, and demonstrate that it has
been a more significant factor on foreign direct investments
after 9/11. Vadlamannati (2012) examine the investments of
US firms in 101 different countries and find a relationship
between a low level of political risk and increasing profit-
ability. In a study from Turkey, Kaya et al. (2015) present
evidence concerning the long term inverse relationship be-
tween BIST100 returns and political risk. As for Çam (2014),
he finds a significant connection between the value of the
companies traded in BIST and the political risk of Turkey.
3. Econometric methodology3.1. Kapetanios unit root testPerron (1989) shows that structural breaks have significant
effects on the results of unit root tests. Subsequently, Banerjee,
Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) and Zivot and Andrews (1992)
introduce a unit root test that takes into account one struc-
tural break. As for Kapetanios (2005), he develops another
unit root test modeled under five structural breaks. Kapetanios
(2005) test is based on the following model:
yt ¼ m0 þ m1tþ ayt1 þ
Xk
i¼1
giDyti þ
Xm
i¼1
fiDUi;t
þ
Xm
i¼1
jiDTi;t þ εt
ð1Þ
where 1  g(L) has all the roots out of unit circle and
g(L) ¼ g1(L) þ … þ gk(L)k. The estimation of the vector
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covariance matrix. As for DUi,t and DTi,t, they denote intercept
and slope coefficients divided in accordance with zt. For the
Equation (1), OLS estimation and break dates are obtained as
below:
bqðd1;…;dmÞ ¼JTðd1;…;dmÞ12Tðd1;…;dmÞ ð2Þ
where
2Tðd1;…;dmÞ ¼ X1T
XT
i¼1
zt1ðd1;…;dmÞ yt ð3Þ
and
JTðd1;…;dmÞ ¼ X1T
XT
i¼1
zt1ðd1;…;dmÞ zt1ðd1;…;dmÞ0X1T
ð4Þ
Finally 4Tðd1;…; dmÞ ¼ X1T
PT
i¼1zt1ðd1;…; dmÞεt.3.2. Maki cointegration testSince structural breaks may affect the performance of
cointegration analysis, the results become mostly spurious. As
such Maki (2012) introduces a cointegration analysis that
takes an unspecified number of breaks into account. This re-
sidual based analysis assumes that the unspecified number of
breaks of the cointegrating vector is equal to or less than the
maximum number of breaks. The author uses the following
regression models for cointegration analysis in the presence of
structural breaks.
yt ¼ mþ
Xk
i¼1
miDi;t þ b0xt þ ut ð5Þ
yt ¼ mþ
Xk
i¼1
miDi;t þ b0xt þ
Xk
i¼1
b0ixtDi;t þ ut ð6Þ
yt ¼ mþ
Xk
i¼1
miDi;t þ gtþ b0xt þ
Xk
i¼1
b0ixtDi;t þ ut ð7Þ
yt ¼ mþ
Xk
i¼1
miDi;t þ gtþ
Xk
i¼1
gitDi;t þ b0xt þ
Xk
i¼1
b0ixtDi;t þ ut
ð8Þ
where t¼1, 2, …, T. yt and xt ¼ ðx1t;…; xmtÞ0 denotes
observable I (1) variables. ut is equilibrium error. m, mi, g, gi,
b0 ¼ (b1, … , bm), and b0 ¼ (bi1, …, bim) are the true pa-
rameters. If t > TBi (i ¼ 1,…, k), Di,t has the value 1, otherwise
it is zero. k denotes the maximum number of breaks and TBi is
the break dates. The above equations present the following
models respectively: level shifts, level shift with trend, regime
shifts, and regime shifts with trend.3.3. ICSS and modified ICSS testInclan and Tiao (1994) improve an algorithm that is based
on the detection of multiple breaks in the variance of a time
series consisting of random observations. The authors use the
iterated cumulative sums of the squares, based on the centered
cumulative sums of squares method of Brown, Durbin, and
Evans (1975), to determine break points. In the modeling, a
[t1:t2] denotes the series at1 ; at1þ1;…; at2 ; t1 < t2 and Dk(a
[t1:t2]) are the intervals on which cumulative sums are ob-
tained. The steps of their algorithm are as follows:
Step 0. t1 ¼ 1
Step 1. Dk(a[t1:T]) is calculated. k*(a[t1:T]) is the point on
which maxkjDk(a[t1:T])j is obtained. In addition,
Mðt1 : TÞ ¼ max
t1kT
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðT  t1 þ 1Þ=2p
Dkða½t1 : T Þ
. If
M(t1:T ) > D* there is a break, hence the process proceeds
to the next step otherwise the algorithm is finalized.
Step 2a. t2 ¼ k*(a[t1:T]). In this condition CCSM is applied
to t2. If M(t1:t2) > D*, there is a new break point so the
same procedure is performed until M(t1:t2) < D*. In this
case, the first break is demonstrated as kfirst ¼ t2.
Step 2b. In this stage, starting from the first break, the same
procedure is repeated till the end of series.
Step 3. If two or more break points exist, providing that
cp denotes break points, two extreme values are
assigned: cp0 ¼ 0 and cpNTþ1 ¼ T . In the following step,
each break point is checked calcu-
lating Dkða½cpj1 þ 1 : cpjþ1Þ; j ¼ 1; …; bNt. If M([cpj1
þ1:cpjþ1]) > D*, then the point is kept, otherwise it is
eliminated.
As stated by Mandelbrot (1963) and Nolan (2003), financial
time series display significant departures from normality
assumption and present leptokurtic distributions and fat tails.
Considering this fat, Sanso et al. (2004) introduce a new
variance break analysis, the modified ICSS test, which, with a
lack of nuisance parameters for identical and independent zero
mean random variables: k. Following the study of Sanso et al.
(2004) we can present the classical ICSS test as follows:
ICSS¼ sup
k

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T=2Dk
p 
where Dk ¼ CkCT  kT and Ck ¼
Pk
t¼1ε
2
t ; k ¼ 1;…; T is the cu-
mulative sum of squares of εt. Using this definition we can
demonstrate the modified ICSS test as below:
k¼ sup
k
T1=2Bk

where Bk ¼ Ck
k
T CTﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbh4bs4p , bh4 ¼ T
1PT
t¼1ε
4
t and bs2 ¼ T1CT :
4. Empirical analysis
In this stage of the study, through econometrical methods,
we analyze whether the Turkish stock market is susceptible to
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daily log prices the BIST100 index in the period of January 02,
2001 to December 23, 2014. For external data, we employ the
following: log prices of Dow&Jones Index (DJI), Euro-Dollar
Parity (E/D), 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), and Brent Oil (OIL). All data are obtained from the
database of the Central Bank of Turkey and the St. Louis Fed.
The econometrical analyses are conducted in two sections. In
the first section, we apply the Kapetanios (2005) unit root test,
the Maki (2012) cointegration test, the Fully Modified Ordi-
nary Least Squares (FMOLS) Cointegrating Regression, the
Inclan and Tiao (1994) Iterative Cumulative Sum of Squares
(ICSS) test and modified ICSS test. Following the acquisition
of break dates in the variance of BIST100 returns, in the
second section we examine the statistical characteristics of the
regimes obtained by means of breaks using Semi-Variance,
Downside Potential, Downside Frequency, Kappa, Volatility
Skewness, and CornisheFisher Value at Risk (henceforth,
CFVaR). Empirical analyses are conducted using Matlab,
GAUSS, E-Views and R software.4.1. Section AStructural breaks seen in financial time series may cause
artificial results in different tests from unit root to long
memory analysis. Kapetanios (2005) develops a unit root test
which allows for an unspecified number of breaks. Since the
variables used in cointegration analysis are supposed to be
integrated of same order, we apply the Kapetanios (2005) unit
root test for all of the variables before the Maki (2012) coin-
tegration analysis. The results are presented in Table 1. AsTable 1
Kapetanios test results.
Variables Test statistic Break dates
BIST100 6.1919 10.06.2002
07.11.2005
09.10.2007
16.10.2008
01.04.2010
DJI 6.3919 03.09.2002
04.12.2006
07.05.2007
27.02.2009
20.05.2010
E/D 5.5736 02.12.2003
14.11.2005
06.02.2008
21.02.2008
16.10.2008
LIBOR 4.3925 04.06.2003
25.05.2005
03.09.2010
03.01.2012
01.11.2013
OIL 4.3676 24.09.2001
03.01.2006
05.03.2008
23.02.2009
16.04.2014stated by Engle and Yoo (1987), time series, which are indi-
vidually stationary in the first difference, can be stationary in
their linear combinations without differencing. In this case
these variables are defined as cointegrated. Hence, before the
Maki (2012) analysis used in the determination of long term
relationship, we need to determine the order of stationary of
the time series analyzed. Within the context of the information
obtained from unit root tests, the rest of the analysis is con-
ducted with the variables as they are I(1).
The critical values of the five breaks model are 7.395,
6.717 and 6.417 for the confidence levels at 99%, 95% and
90%, respectively. As the results show in Table 1, null hy-
pothesis (d ¼ 1) cannot be rejected for the variables of
BIST100, DJ, E/D, LIBOR, OIL at any confidence levels. This
situation indicates that in the presence of structural breaks, all
of the time series are stationary in the first differences. Since
the Kapetanios (2005) unit root test results imply a cointe-
grated long-term relationship between the variables, in the
following stage we conduct a Maki (2012) cointegration test
which takes structural breaks into account. In the application
of the Maki (2012) test we use four different models: Level
Shift, Level Shift with Trend, Regime Shifts, and finally
Regime Shifts and Trend. In all of the alternative models,
when the log prices of the BIST100 index are used as the
dependent variables, other time series are integrated to the
model as independent variables. The obtained results are
presented in Table 2.
According to the results in Table 2, all the obtained test
statistics of the different models are statistically significant at a
99% confidence level. Under these circumstances, it can be
said that there is a long term relationship between the
BIST100 index and other variables (DJ, E/D, LIBOR, and
OIL). As seen, the robustness of the test results has increased
with the consideration of the structural breaks. The results
obtained from this test have a great importance as they will be
used in the FMOLS model that gives the residuals, from which
we will attain regimes. Since all independent variables have
statistically significant effects on the dependent variable, we
estimate FMOLS without changing the structure of the model.
Table 3 below presents the results.
While the results in Table 3 give information regarding the
short term relationship between the dependent and indepen-
dent variables, the more important information for this study is
the magnitude and the sign of the coefficients, and theTable 2
Maki (2012) test results.
Model 0:
level shift
Model 1: level
shift with
trend
Model 2:
regime shifts
Model 3:
regime shifts
and trend
Test statistic 18.739459**
(6.856)
18.889817**
(7.053)
18.854582**
(9.441)
19.232618**
(10.08)
Break dates 20.09.2001
25.05.2005
24.02.2006
11.12.2007
19.11.2008
03.01.2002
24.02.2006
11.10.2007
21.10.2010
21.05.2013
08.07.2002
25.03.2003
28.01.2004
26.01.2006
26.05.2008
02.01.2002
05.11.2002
02.01.2004
24.01.2006
23.05.2008
** Indicates the significance at 5% level.
Table 3
FMOLS test results.
Variables Test statistic (R-squared: 0.912880)
Constant 0.060554 (0.275972)
DJI 0.780299** (0.078435
E/D 0.788978** (0.134834)
LIBOR 0.071912** (0.010382
OIL 0.758989** (0.045821)
26 S. G€unay / Borsa _Istanbul Review 16-1 (2016) 21e31residuals of the model. We can see that each coefficient sign is
consistent with our theoretical expectations. The DJI coeffi-
cient sign is positive, meaning that movements in DJI cause
moves in the same direction in the BIST100 index. Likewise,
the OIL variable sign is positive as well. The growth in the
world economy increases the demand on oil, as it is one of the
most important inputs of industrial production. Undoubtedly,
these increases in oil demand result in a price rise. Therefore,
when we link together the increases in the BIST100 index and
the growth in the world economy, the oil prices with a positive
coefficient are more comprehensible. The last positive coef-
ficient belongs to the E/D parameter. Increments in the E/D
parameter mean a loss of Dollar value against the Euro.
Foreign debt and the cost of the energy inputs of Turkey are
mostly dollar-denominated, whereas the share of European
countries and the Euro in the exports of Turkey are higher than
other countries and the Dollar. That is, while imports are
mostly dollar-denominated, Turkey's export generally consists
of Euro-denominated incomes. For this case, the increases in
the Euro/Dollar parity can be assessed as a beneficial
circumstance for Turkey. The only negative coefficient ob-
tained is the LIBOR variable, which coincides with our
theoretical expectation. The literature concerning the rela-
tionship of stock prices with interest rates, demonstrates that
there is a negative interaction between these variables (for
instance see Alam & Uddin, 2009). That is, increases in in-
terest rates cause decreases in stock prices. The obtained
findings support this claim. Considering the magnitude of the
coefficients, it is observed that the lowest coefficient belongs
to LIBOR, and that the DJI, OIL, and E/D coefficients have a
higher degree of effect on the BIST100 index.-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Fig. 1. Residuals ofFig. 1 presents the residuals of the FMOLS model. As seen
from the figure, we removed the trend in the BIST100 index
through the filtration procedure. In the modeling of the
FMOLS model, price movements in the BIST100 index have
been explained by the variables that are related to the inter-
national markets. The R square value, which demonstrates the
explanatory power of the model, is obtained as 0.9128. As the
independent variables pay regard to the international markets,
we believe that the residuals, which are the unexplained sec-
tion of the FMOLS model, are also significantly related to the
domestic market conditions. While these domestic variables
may consist of economic, financial, social and political fac-
tors; the political factor effect on the BIST100 index can be
easily seen in the break dates through the ICSS and modified
ICSS tests since we know the dates of political issues.
Therefore, in this stage we obtain the residuals of the FMOLS
model (see Fig. 1) and present their ICSS and modified ICSS
test results in Table 4.
In Table 4, n denotes the order of the breaks in the data and
t shows the break dates in time. As can be seen from the re-
sults, there are many breaks in the residuals of the FMOLS
model. The 11 breaks (in Panel A) obtained from the ICSS test
mean 12 different regimes in the period of January 02, 2001 to
December 23, 2014. These periods and break dates can be
seen in Fig. 2 below. When we pay attention to the break dates,
it is clear that e except for the years 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010,
and 2012 e there are many breaks in the return volatility of
residuals of the FMOLS model. As stated in Section 1, how-
ever, there were important political developments in these
years: local elections (2004), the difficulty in appointing the
governor of the central bank Turkey (2006), the crisis of the
appointment of the chief of general staff (2006), the attack
against the State Council (2006), the hand grenades found in
U¨mraniye/_Istanbul (2007), the post-modern military coup de-
bates (2007), the presidential election (2007), and the Balyoz
case (2010).
On the other hand, as aforementioned above we have also
conducted the modified ICSS test of Sanso et al. (2004) due to
the inherent drawbacks of the ICSS test. As seen from the
Panel B in Table 4, the respective break dates are consistent08 09 10 11 12 13 14
FMOLS model.
Table 4
ICSS and modified ICSS test results.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ICSS test n 222 460 563 1002 1873 2066 2717 3094 3142 3334 3445
t 20.112001 01.112002 07.042003 11.012005 24.062008 02.042009 02.112011 30.042013 08.072013 15.042014 01.102014
Modified ICSS test n 233 459 562 1001 1872 2065 2716 e e e e
t 05.12.2001 31.10.2002 04.04.2003 10.01.2005 23.06.2008 01.04.2009 01.11.2011 e e e e
Fig. 2. Results of ICSS test.
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break. According to the modified ICSS test, there is no break
after November 02, 2011 in the volatility of BIST100 index
returns. In this respect, the last four breaks of the ICSS test are
spurious. This result might arise from the drawbacks of the
ICSS test, which does not take into account departures from
normality assumption in returns. These findings demonstrate
that after November 02, 2011, the stock market displays a
more robust behavior against political events, or it isn't
considered as risky as before. This result shows a significant
difference between the ICSS and the modified ICSS test.
In this stage we examine ICSS test results to see whether
there is any correlation between breaks and political events
after November 02, 2011. As stated the break dates are almost
identical before November 02, 2011 for both methods. In
considering the years with breaks in the ICSS test, we notice
that the first break date corresponds approximately to the end
of the 2001 crisis in Turkey. The second break literally occurs
at the same time as the general elections in 2002. The next
break happens just after the parliamentary memorandumregarding the invasion of Iraq by the US military. We observe
no significant political or social event that coincides with the
fourth break. However, we have seen that this break does in
fact coincide with the redenomination of the Turkish Lira,
which removed 6 zeros from the currency. Although the
redenomination of the Turkish Lira seems like an economic
event, our model presents this action as a political matter.
Likewise, the then Prime Minister Erdogan states that this is
not just a cosmetic change in economy (Boland, 2004). In
brief we can consider this action as a result of the economic
and political stability of Turkey in that period. While the fifth
break happens during the period of mortgage crisis in 2008,
as we considerably filter foreign market developments in the
FMOLS model, we expect to see internal reasons for the
formation of this break. The break date, June 24, 2008,
closely corresponds to the closure case of AKP. The
following break can be associated with local elections.
Although there is a time difference between the seventh break
and the general election, this break happens right after the
general election.
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just in the ICSS test, occur in 2013 and the others in 2014. The
breaks in 2013 happen in early May and July. The second of
them approximately corresponds to the peak of the Gezi Park
protests. The revealed regime after this break incorporates the
December 17e25 operations. This result can also be evalu-
ated, as there are no breaks in December 17 or 25. Although a
political crisis period has arisen in the regime following the
break in July 08, 2013, the subsequent break happens nearly
nine months later. As it is understood, the characteristics of the
period remain the same until April 15, 2015. This date is just
after the local elections. The presidential election is also held
in this term, and the regime is finalized as of November 2014.
As we stated before, these last four breaks and corresponding
five regimes, are only results of the ICSS test. The modified
ICSS test, however, indicates the absence of these breaks and
regimes. Since the modified ICSS test also takes into account
the departures from normality of the financial time series, we
consider that these four breaks may be spurious. As a matter of
fact, as seen above, the breaks that happen in 2013 and 2014
cannot be properly matched with political events. That also
supports the findings of the modified ICSS test.
We present above two figures concerning the break dates.
Panel A demonstrates only the break dates and regimes (with
numbers on top) detected in the return volatilities of residuals
of the FMOLS model through the ICSS (11 breaks) and the
modified ICSS test (7 breaks) in which international market's
effect has been filtered for the BIST100 log price. Panel B,
however, presents the breaks and regimes directly obtained
from the return volatilities of BIST100 index without filtration.
As stated, Panel B in Fig. 2 presents the results of the ICSS
test (in red dashed lines) that were directly applied to the
returns of the BIST100 index. While there are a maximum of
11 breaks regarding the return volatilities of residuals of the
FMOLS model, there are 23 breaks in the returns of the
BIST100 index. The difference between these numbers in our
opinion arises from the international market's effect which is
not being filtered in the second ICSS test (Panel B).
The results show that the break dates of the ICSS (except
for the last 4 breaks) and the modified ICSS test coincide with
political events in Turkey. In other words, some of the political
issues cause a break in Turkish stock markets. Another inter-
esting finding is the insignificant effects of the last political
events on the Turkish stock market after November 02, 2011.
Besides, we have seen that the market has not evaluated the
political events of 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2010, as risk inducing
as other political developments. So far, we have just detected
the break dates and matched this dates with political events.
The statistical properties of the regimes may provide more
efficient views in terms of the characteristics of these periods.
This analysis is conducted in Section B below.4.2. Section BIn this section of the study, we conduct various statistical
tests in order to reveal the specific characteristics of the ob-
tained regimes between breaks. Besides the significantinformation presented by the break dates e that is, the exact
dates of specific political events e the regimes within these
breaks, reveal additional important information regarding the
market's reaction to these events. As stated before, the breaks
in the return volatilities of residuals create different regimes.
In the analysis of these regimes, we use the following tests:
Semi Variance, Downside Potential, Downside Frequency,
Kappa, Volatility Skewness, and CFVaR. The obtained results
are presented in Table 5.
As can be seen from the results, there is no stability in the
length of regimes. The ninth and tenth regimes take 48 and 57
days respectively, whereas the fifth and seventh regimes span
871 and 651 days. According to the ICSS test, due to the
developments following the eighth regime, there has been a
significant decrease in the length of regimes. This situation can
be interpreted as the result of unstable periods. However, the
statistical properties of the regimes do not confirm our pre-
sumptions about instability. Despite the higher break fre-
quency of recent regimes, we can see that their risk level is
significantly lower than the earlier regimes. From semi-
variance to CFVaR, all of the tests support this result. In
addition, this finding is also supported by the results of the
modified ICSS test. According to this test, there are no sta-
tistically significant breaks after the seventh break. As such,
the last regime (between November 02, 2011 and December
23, 2014) is quite long and stable despite the existence of
political events in the country. In the rest of the study, we
analyze the statistical properties of the regimes through Semi
Variance, Downside Potential, Downside Frequency, Kappa,
Volatility Skewness and CFVaR. Although we present all the
regimes obtained from the 11 breaks, it should be kept in mind
that the last 4 breaks (and the last five regimes) may be arti-
ficial because they are obtained only from the ICSS test. In
Figs. 3 and 4 we present the behavior of the regimes.
As stated by Carl and Peterson (2014) Semi-Variance,
which is suggested by Markowitz (1959) as a risk measure to
replace variance, is a downside risk indicator. While the Semi-
Variance statistic fluctuates in the period of 2001e2015, it
displays a decreasing trend year by year. Although it reaches
its highest level in the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 9th regimes, its his-
torical average drops significantly following the 9th regime.
On the other hand, there is a significant increase in the number
of breaks after the 9th regime, but we see that their risk level is
not higher than before. A similar case can be observed in the
Downside Potential statistic. Downside Potential statistic can
be seen as a different form of Downside Deviation, introduced
by Sortino and Lee (1994). In Downside Potential the mini-
mum acceptable return is a parameter of the function.
Downside Potential, which reaches the highest rate at the same
time with Semi-Variance, is under a decreasing annual trend as
well. Despite the increase in Semi-Variance in the last regime,
Downside Potential follows a decreasing period even in the
last regime. Downside Frequency, which displays the fre-
quency of downfalls under the minimum acceptable return, is,
comparatively, under the average in recent years, except for
the peak seen in the ninth regime. In the calculation of
Downside Frequency, the length of the return set, which is
Table 5
Statistical characteristics of the regimes.
Regime n Semi variance Downside potential Downside frequency Kappa Volatility skewness CFVaR
Regimes signed by ICSS
and Modified ICSS test
1 221 0.000208 0.000073 0.479638 0.064993 1.092928 0.000338
2 238 0.000130 0.000057 0.525210 0.071427 0.915672 0.000220
3 103 0.000190 0.000068 0.475728 0.005690 1.026285 0.000293
4 439 0.000113 0.000044 0.501139 0.021330 1.084981 0.000183
5 871 0.000096 0.000038 0.500574 0.052367 0.811162 0.000159
6 193 0.000189 0.000060 0.430052 0.141693 1.160750 0.000290
7 651 0.000092 0.000038 0.511521 0.026018 1.031380 0.000151
Regimes signed by only
ICSS test
8 377 0.000067 0.000024 0.477454 0.082456 1.279463 0.000102
9 48 0.000152 0.000059 0.562500 0.180968 0.366724 0.000275
10 192 0.000083 0.000033 0.500000 0.045439 0.936031 0.000132
11 111 0.000049 0.000016 0.441441 0.219368 1.430134 0.000077
12 57 0.000072 0.000015 0.350877 1.023602 5.650060 0.000080
Fig. 3. Behavior of regimes.
Fig. 4. Behavior of regimes.
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return number. The results show that the number of returns
under the minimum acceptable return is quite low in recent
years. In other words, these results indicate a decrease in the
frequency of price movements that cause losses.
Another test statistic in the definition of regimes is the
generalized downside risk-adjusted statistic Kappa. l value is
assigned as 2 in the calculation of Kappa, a condition under
which the Kappa statistic transforms into a Sortino Ratio.
Kappa is a performance criterion in the rank of portfolios,
where higher Kappa values mean higher performance in the
portfolio. In conjunction with the Volatility Skewness, the
Kappa statistic is in an uptrend in recent years. Except for its
use with second partial moment, Volatility Skewness is a
similar coefficient to Omega. The last statistic is the CFVaR.As a robust risk measure, Value at Risk (VaR) provides in-
formation concerning the highest loss rate or amount that can
be exposed in a portfolio at a specific confidence level. Since
financial asset returns generally display departures from
normal distribution, and that it is a commonly accepted fact in
finance theory, in this study we prefer to use the CFVaR
method which takes into account the fat tails in the return
distribution. The results obtained under 95% confidence level
regarding the CFVaR method also corroborate our earlier
findings. The CFVaR, which demonstrates high losses con-
cerning the 1st, 3rd, 6th, and 9th regimes, indicates a decrease
in losses after the 9th regime. The 11th and the 12th regimes
have the lowest CFVaR values and display a vertical trend.
Tests in the first and second sections demonstrate that the
breaks in the volatility of the BIST100 index returns show
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period of January 02, 2001eNovember 02, 2011. Another
interesting implication is the increasing number of breaks in
the last periods, corresponding to Turkey's most recent polit-
ical events. However, this explanation is valid only for the
frequency of breaks, not for the behavior or characteristics of
the regimes. The regimes demonstrated that risk level is
relatively low in the last periods considering the mean risk
level of the 14 years we analyzed.
5. Conclusion
One of the most efficient parameters of sovereign risk is
political risk. Turkey gives the impression of a stable and fast
growing economy thanks to the reforms following the crisis
in 2001, though political risk is still a reality for Turkey. The
scope of this study is to test potential risks arising from po-
litical events and the magnitude of their effects on Turkish
stock markets. In accordance with this purpose, first we
determine the relationship of the BIST100 index with inter-
national financial markets and filter the effects of interna-
tional parameters in order to obtain a stock market that
contains mostly internal risk factors. In this process first we
use the Kapetanios (2005) unit root test and utilizing the
determined I(1) series, we conduct Maki (2012) cointegration
analysis. The results of the Maki (2012) cointegration anal-
ysis show that the BIST100 index and Dow-Jones Index,
Brent oil prices, 3 months LIBOR rates, and the Euro/Dollar
parity have long term relationship in the presence of struc-
tural breaks. The sign of the estimated parameters of the
FMOLS model, which is formed by the previous variables, is
consistent with our theoretical expectations. Following the
attainment of the residuals of the FMOLS model, we conduct
an ICSS and a modified ICSS test to the returns of these
residuals. The test results of the ICSS analysis exhibit 11
breaks, while the modified ICSS test gives only 7 breaks in
the return volatilities of residuals. Since there is no (or
minimal) foreign market effect in the residuals of FMOLS
model, the source of these breaks is determined to be internal
factors, including political events. In addition, when we apply
the same tests directly to the return volatilities of the
BIST100 index, without any filtration procedure, we obtain
23 breaks. The break dates of the modified ICSS test mostly
correspond to significant political events in Turkey. In the
second section of the empirical analysis, we examine the
statistical properties of the regimes that arise from the breaks.
According to the results of the Semi-Variance, Downside
Potential, Downside Frequency, Kappa, Volatility Skewness,
and CornisheFisher Value at Risk for ICSS test, the risk level
of the recent regimes are significantly under its mean and its
trend is downward, although the number of breaks are
strikingly high in recent years. When we consider the results
of the modified ICSS test, on the other hand, it is obvious that
the last regime (between November 02, 2011 and December
23, 2014) in the Turkish stock market is quite stable
compared to previous regimes.References
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